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Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved significant performance in various tasks. However, recent
studies have shown that DNNs can be easily fooled by small perturbation on the input, called adversarial
attacks. As the extensions of DNNs to graphs, Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have been demonstrated to
inherit this vulnerability. Adversary can mislead GNNs to give wrong predictions by modifying the graph
structure such as manipulating a few edges. This vulnerability has arisen tremendous concerns for adapting
GNNs in safety-critical applications and has attracted increasing research attention in recent years. Thus, it
is necessary and timely to provide a comprehensive overview of existing graph adversarial attacks and the
countermeasures. In this survey, we categorize existing attacks and defenses, and review the corresponding
state-of-the-art methods. Furthermore, we have developed a repository with representative algorithms1. The
repository enables us to conduct empirical studies to deepen our understandings on attacks and defenses on
graphs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Graphs can be used as the denotation of a large number of systems across various areas such as
social science (social networks), natural science (physical systems, and protein-protein interaction
networks) and knowledge graphs. Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), which generalize traditional
deep neural networks (DNNs) to graphs, pave a new way to effectively learn representations for
graphs [46]. Due to their strong representation learning capability, GNNs have gained practical
significance in various applications ranging from data mining [21], natural language processing [29],
and computer vision [22] to healthcare and biology [26].
As new generalizations of traditional DNNs to graphs, GNNs inherit both advantages and dis-
advantages of traditional DNNs. Similar to traditional DNNs, GNNs are also powerful in learning
representations of graphs and have permeated numerous areas of science and technology. Tradi-
tional DNNs are easily fooled by adversarial attacks [16, 47]. In other words, the adversary can
1https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust/tree/master/deeprobust/graph
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Fig. 1. An example of adversarial attack on graph data. The goal of the GNN is to predict the color of the
nodes. Here node 7 is the target node. Attacker aims to change the prediction of GNN on node 7 by modifying
the edges and features.
insert slight perturbation during either the training or test phases, and the DNN models will totally
fail. It is evident [55] that GNNs also inherit this drawback. The attacker can generate graph
adversarial perturbations by manipulating the graph structure or node features to fool the GNN
models. As illustrated in Figure 1, originally node 7 was classified by the GNN model as a green
node; after node 7 creates a new connection with node 3 and modifies its own features, the GNN
model misclassifies it as a blue node. Such vulnerability of GNNs has arisen tremendous concerns
on applying them in safety-critical applications such as financial system and risk management.
For example, in a credit scoring system, fraudsters can fake connections with several high-credit
customers to evade the fraudster detection models; and spammers can easily create fake followers
to increase the chance of fake news being recommended and spread. Therefore, there is an urgent
need to investigate graph adversarial attacks and their countermeasures.
Pushing this research has a great potential to facilitate the successful adoption of GNNs in
a broader range of fields, which encourages increasing attention on graph adversarial attacks
and defenses in recent years. Thus, it is necessary and timely to provide a comprehensive and
systematic overview on existing algorithms. Meanwhile, it is of great importance to deepen our
understandings on graph adversarial attacks via empirical study. These understandings can not
only provide knowledge about the behaviors of attacks but also offer insights for us to design
defense strategies. These motivate this survey with the following key purposes:
• We categorize existing attack methods from various perspectives in Section 3 and review
representative algorithms in Section 4.
• We classify existing countermeasures according to their defense strategies and give a review
on representative algorithms for each category in Section 5.
• We perform empirical studies based on the repository we developed that provide comprehen-
sive understandings on graph attacks and defenses in Section 6.
• We discuss some promising future directions in Section 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
Before presenting the review and empirical studies, we first introduce concepts, notations and
definitions in this section.
2.1 Learning on Graph Data
In this survey, we use G = (V ,E) to denote the structure of a graph where V = {v1, . . . ,vN } is
the set of N nodes and E = {e1, . . . , eK } is the edge set. We use matrix A ∈ {0, 1}N×N to denote
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the adjacency matrix of G, where each entry Ai j = 1 means nodes vi and vj are connected in G.
Furthermore, we use X ∈ RN×D to denote the node attribute matrix where D is the dimension of
the node feature vectors. Thus, graph data can be denoted asG = (A,X). There are a lot of learning
tasks on graphs and in this work, we focus on the classification problems on graphs. Furthermore,
we use fθ with parameters θ to denote the learning models in this survey.
Node-Level Classification For node-level classification, each node in the graph G belongs to a
class in the label set Y . The graph model aims to learn a neural network, based on labeled nodes
(training nodes), denoted as VL , to predict the class of unlabeled nodes (test nodes). The training
objective function can be formulated as:
min
θ
Ltrain(fθ (G)) =
∑
vi ∈VL
ℓ (fθ (X,A)i ,yi ) , (1)
where fθ (X,A)i and yi are the predicted and the true label of node vi and ℓ(·, ·) is a loss function
such as cross entropy.
Graph-Level Classification For graph-level classification, each individual graph has a class in
the label set Y . We use G to denote a set of graphs, and GL is the labeled set (training set) of G. The
goal of graph-level classification is to learn a mapping function fθ : G → Y to predict the labels of
unlabeled graphs. Similar to node-level classification, the objective function can be formulated as
min
θ
Ltrain(G) =
∑
Gi ∈GL
ℓ (fθ (Gi ),yi ) , (2)
where Gi is the labeled graph with ground truth yi and fθ (Gi ) is the prediction of the graph Gi .
2.2 A General Form of Graph Adversarial Attack
Based on the objectives in Section 2.1, we can define a general form of the objective for adversarial
attacks, which aims to maximize the loss value of the model in order to get wrong predictions.
Thus, the problem of node-level graph adversarial attacks can be stated as:
Problem 1. Given G = (A,X) and victim nodes subset Vt ⊆ V . Let yu denote the class for node u
(predicted or using ground truth). The goal of the attacker is to find a perturbed graph Gˆ = (Aˆ, Xˆ) that
maximizes the loss value of the victim nodes,
max Latk(fθ (Gˆ)) =
∑
u ∈Vt
ℓatk
(
fθ ∗ (Gˆ)u ,yu
)
s .t ., θ ∗ = argmin
θ
Ltrain (fθ (G ′)),
(3)
where G ′ can either be G or Gˆ. Note that Gˆ is chosen from a constrained domain Φ(G). Given a fixed
perturbation budget ∆, a typical Φ(G) can be implemented as,
∥Aˆ − A∥0 + ∥Xˆ − X∥0 ≤ ∆. (4)
We omit the definition of graph-level adversarial attacks since (1) the graph-level adversarial
attacks can be defined similarly and (2) the majority of the adversarial attacks and defenses focus on
node-level. Though adversarial attacks have been extensively studied in the image domain, we still
need dedicated efforts for graphs due to unique challenges – (1) graph structure is discrete; (2) the
nodes in the graph are not independent; and (3) it is difficult to measure whether the perturbation
on the graph is imperceptible or not.
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Table 1. Commonly used notations
Notations Description Notations Description
G Graph u Target node
Gˆ Perturbed graph yu Label of node u
V The set of nodes fθ Neural network model
VL The set of labeled nodes L Loss function
E The set of edges l(·, ·) Pair-wise loss function
A Adjacency matrix ∥ · ∥0 ℓ0 norm
Aˆ Perturbed adjacency matrix ∆ Perturbation budget
X Node attribute matrix Z Predicted probability
Xˆ Perturbed node attribute matrix hu Hidden representation of node u
D Dimension of node features ei j Edge between node vi and vj
2.3 Notations
With the aforementioned definitions, we list all the notations which will be used in the following
sections in Table 1.
3 TAXONOMY OF GRAPH ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we briefly introduce the main taxonomy of adversarial attacks on graph structured
data. Attack algorithms can be categorized into different types based on different goals, resources,
knowledge and capacity of attackers. We try to give a clear overview on the main components of
graph adversarial attacks.
3.1 Attacker’s Capacity
The adversarial attacks can happen at two phases, i.e., the model training and model testing. It
depends on the attacker’s capacity to insert adversarial perturbation:
• Evasion Attack: Attacking happens after the GNN model is trained or in the test phase.
The model is fixed, and the attacker cannot change the model parameter or structure. The
attacker performs evasion attack when G ′ = G in Eq. (3).
• Poisoning Attack: Attacking happens before the GNN model is trained. The attacker can
add “poisons” into the model training data, letting trained model have malfunctions. It is the
case when G ′ = Gˆ in Eq. (3).
3.2 Perturbation Type
The attacker can insert adversarial perturbations from different aspects. The perturbations can be
categorized as modifying node features, adding/deleting edges, and adding fake nodes. Attackers
should also keep the perturbation unnoticeable, otherwise it would be easily detected.
• Modifying Feature: Attackers can slightly change the node features while maintaining the
graph structure.
• Adding or Deleting Edges: Attackers can add or delete edges under certain budget of total
actions.
• Injecting Nodes: Attackers can insert fake nodes to the graph, and link it with some benign
nodes in the graph.
3.3 Attacker’s Goal
According to the goals of attacks, we can divide the attacks into the following two categories
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• Targeted Attack: There is a small set of test nodes. The attacker aims to let the trained
model misclassify these test samples. It is the case when Vt ⊂ V in Eq. (3). We can further
divide targeted attacks into (1) direct attack where the attacker directly modifies the features
or edges of the target nodes and (2) influencer attack where the attacker can only manipulate
other nodes to influence the targets.
• Untargeted Attack: The attacker aims to insert poisons to let the trained model have bad
overall performance on all test data. It is the case when Vt = V in Eq. (3).
3.4 Attacker’s Knowledge
Attacker’s knowledge means how much information an attacker knows about the model that he
aims to attack. Usually, there are three settings:
• White-box Attack: All information about the model parameters, training input (e.g, adja-
cency matrix and attribute matrix) and the labels are given to the attacker.
• Gray-box Attack: The attacker only has limited knowledge about the victim model. For
example, the attacker cannot access the model paramerters but can access the training labels.
Then it can utilize the training data to train surrogate models to estimate the information
from victim model.
• Black-box Attack: The attacker does not have access to the model’s parameters or training
labels. It can access the adjacency matrix and attribute matrix, and do black-box query for
output scores or labels.
3.5 Victim Models
In this part we are going to summarize the victim models that have been proven to be susceptible
to adversarial examples.
Graph Neural Networks Graph neural networks are powerful tools in learning representation of
graphs [35]. One of the most successful GNN variants is Graph Convolutional Networks (GCN) [21].
GCN learns the representation for each node by keeping aggregating and transforming the infor-
mation from its neighbor nodes. Though GNNs can achieve high performance in various tasks,
studies have demonstrated that GNNs including GCN are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [35, 55].
Other Graph Learning Algorithms In addition to graph neural networks, adversary may attack
some other important algorithms for graphs such as network embeddings including LINE [38]
and Deepwalk [31], graph-based semi-supervised learning (G-SSL) [54], and knowledge graph
embedding [4, 24].
4 GRAPH ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we review representative algorithms for graph adversarial attacks. Following the
categorizations in the previous section, we first divide these algorithms into white-box, gray-box
and black-box and then for algorithms in each category, we further group them into targeted and
untargeted attacks. An overall categorization of representative attack methods is shown in Table 2.
In addition, some open source implementations of representative algorithms are listed in Table 5.
4.1 White-box Attacks
In white-box attack setting, the adversary has access to any information about the victim model
such as model parameters, training data, labels, and predictions. Although in most of the real world
cases we do not have the access to such information, we can still assess the vulnerability of the
victim models under the worst situation. Typically, white-box attacks use the gradient information
from the victim model to guide the generation of attacks [6, 9, 45, 48].
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Table 2. Categorization of representative attack methods
Attack Methods AttackKnowledge
Targeted or
Non-targeted
Evasion or
Poisoning Perturbation Type Application Victim Model
PGD, Min-max [48] White-box Untargeted Both Add/Delete edges Node Classification GNN
IG-FGSM [45]
IG-JSMA [45] White-box Both Evasion
Add/Delete edges
Modify features Node Classification GNN
[41] White-boxGray-box Targeted Poisoning Add/Delete edges Node Classification GNN
Nettack [55] Gray-box Targeted Both Add/Delete edgesModify features Node Classification GNN
Metattack [56] Gray-box Untargeted Poisoning Add/Delete edges Node Classification GNN
NIPA [36] Gray-box Untargeted Poisoning Inject nodes Node Classification GNN
RL-S2V [11] Black-box Targeted Evasion Add/Delete edges Graph ClassificationNode Classification GNN
ReWatt [27] Black-box Untargeted Evasion Add/Delete edges Graph Classification GNN
[25] White-boxGray-box Untargted Poisoning
Flip label
Modify features
Classification
Regression G-SSL
GF-Attack [5] Black-box Targeted Evasion Add/Delete edges Node Classification NetworkEmebdding
[2] Black-box Both Poisoning Add/Delete edges Node ClassificationCommunity Detection
Network
Emebdding
[51] White-box Targeted Poisoning Add/Delete facts Plausibility Prediction
Knowledge
Graph
Embedding
CD-Attack [23] Black-box Targeted Poisoning Add/Delete edges Community Detection
Community
Detection
Algorithm
4.1.1 Targeted Attack. Targeted attack aims to mislead the victim model to make wrong predictions
on some target samples. A lot of studies follow the white-box targeted attack setting with a wide
range of real-world applications. FGA [9] extracts the link gradient information from GCN, and
then greedily selects the pair of nodes with maximum absolute gradient to modify the graph
iteratively. Genetic algorithm basedQ-Attack is proposed to attack a number of community detection
algorithms [6]. Iterative gradient attack (IGA) based on the gradient information in the trained
graph auto-encoder, which is introduced to attack link prediction [7]. Furthermore, the vulnerability
of knowledge graph embedding is investigated in [51] and the plausibility of arbitrary facts in
knowledge graph can be effectively manipulated by the attacker. Recommender systems based
on GNNs are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which is shown in [52]. In addition, there are
great efforts on attacking node classification. Traditional attacks in the image domain always use
models’ gradients to find adversarial examples. However, due to the discrete property of graph data,
directly calculating gradients of models could fail. To solve this issue, the work [45] suggests to use
integrated gradient [37] to better search for adversarial edges and feature perturbations. During
the attacking process, the attacker iteratively chooses the edge or feature which has the strongest
effect to the adversarial objective. By this way, it can cause the victim model to misclassify target
nodes with a higher successful rate. The work [50] assumes there is a set of “bad actor” nodes in a
graph. When they flip the edges with any target nodes in a graph, it will cause the GNN model to
have a wrong prediction on the target node. These “bad actor” nodes are critical to the safety of
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GNN models. For example, Wikipedia has hoax articles which have few and random connections
to real articles. Manipulating the connections of these hoax articles will cause the system to make
wrong prediction of the categories of real articles.
4.1.2 Untargeted Attack. Currently there are not many studies on untargeted white-box attack,
and topology attack [48] is one representative algorithm. It first constructs a binary symmetric
perturbation matrix S ∈ {0, 1}n where Si j = 1 indicates to flip the edge between i and j and
Si j = 0 means no modification on Ai j . Thus, the goal of the attacker is to find S that minimizes
the predefined attack loss given a finite budget of edge perturbations ∆, i.e., ∥S∥0 ≤ ∆. It considers
two different attack scenarios: attacking pre-trained GNN with fixed parameters θ and attacking a
re-trainable GNN fθ . For attacking a fixed fθ , the problem can be formulated as,
min
S∈{0,1}n
Latk(fθ (S,A,X)) s.t. ∥S∥0 ≤ ∆. (5)
It utilizes the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) algorithm in [28] to search the optimal S. Note
that the work [28] is also one popular attack algorithm in the image domain. For the re-trainable
GNNs, parameter θ will be retrained after adversarial manipulation, thus the attack problem is
formulated as a min-max form where the inner maximization can be solved by gradient ascent and
the outer minimization can be solved by PGD.
4.2 Gray-box Attacks
White-box attacks assume that attackers can calculate gradient through model parameters, which
is not always practical in real-world scenarios. Gray-box attacks are proposed to generate attacks
with limited knowledge on the victim model [36, 55, 56]. Usually they first train a surrogate model
with the labeled training data to approximate the information of the victim model and then generate
perturbations to attack the surrogate model. It is noted that these models need the access to the
labels of training data, thus they are not black-box attacks that will be introduced in the following
subsection.
4.2.1 Targeted Attack. The early work on targeted gray-box attacks is for graph clustering [10]. It
demonstrates that injecting noise to a DNS query graph can degrade the performance of graph
embedding models. Different from [10], the work [55] proposes an attack method called Nettack
to generate structure and feature attacks, aiming at solving Eq. (3). Besides, they argue that only
limiting the perturbation budgets cannot alwaysmake the perturbation “unnoticeable”. They suggest
the perturbed graphs should also maintain important graph properties, including degree distribution
and feature co-occurrence. Therefore, Nettack first selects possible perturbation candidates not
violating degree distribution and feature co-occurrence of the original graph. Then it greedily
chooses the perturbation that has the largest score to modify the graph, where the score is defined
as,
max
i,y
ln
(
Zu,y (G ′)
) − ln (Zu,i (G ′)) (6)
where Zu,i is the probability of node u to be the class i predicted by the surrogate model. Thus, the
goal of the attacker is to maximize the difference in the log-probabilities of the target node u. By
doing this repeatedly until reaching the perturbation budge ∆, it can get the final modified graph.
Furthermore, it suggests that such graph attack can also transfer from model to model, just as the
attacks in the image domain [16]. The authors also conduct influencer attacks where they can only
manipulate the nodes except the target. It turns out that influencer attacks lead to a lower decrease
in performance compared with directly modifying target node given the same perturbation budget.
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4.2.2 Untargeted Attack. Although following the same way of training a surrogate model as
Nettack, Metattack [56] is a kind of untargeted poisoning attack. It tackles the bi-level problem in
Eq. (3) by using meta-gradient. Basically, it treats the graph structure matrix as a hyper-parameter
and the gradient of the attacker loss with respect to it can be obtained by:
∇metaG = ∇GLatk (fθ ∗ (G)) (7)
Note that ∇GLatk (fθ ∗ (G)) is actually a function with respect to bothG and θ . If θ ∗ is obtained by
some differential operations, we can compute ∇metaG as follows,
∇metaG = ∇f Latk (fθ ∗ (G)) · [∇G fθ ∗ (G) + ∇θ ∗ fθ ∗ (G) · ∇Gθ ∗] (8)
where θ ∗ is often obtained by gradient descent in fixed iterations T . At iteration t + 1, the gradient
of θt+1 with respect to G can be formulated as,
∇Gθt+1 = ∇Gθt − α∇G∇θtLtrain
(
fθt (G)
)
, (9)
where α denotes learning rate of the gradient descent operation. By unrolling the training procedure
from θT back to θ0, we can get ∇GθT and then ∇metaG . A greedy approach is applied to select the
perturbation based on the meta gradient.
Instead of modifying the connectivity of existing nodes, a novel reinforment learning method
for node injection poisoning attacks (NIPA) [36] is proposed to inject fake nodes into graph data .
Specifically, NIPA first injects singleton n nodes into the original graph. Then in each action at , the
attacker first chooses an injected node to connect with another node in the graph and then assigns
a label to the injected node. By doing this sequentially, the final graph is statistically similar to the
original graph but can degrade the overall model performance.
4.3 Black-box Attacks
Different from gray-box attacks, black-box attacks [2, 5, 11, 27, 36] are more challenging since the
attacker can only access the input and output of the victim model. The access of parameters, labels
and predicted probability is prohibited.
4.3.1 Targeted Attack. As mentioned earlier, training a surrogate model requires access to the
labels of training data, which is not always practical. We hope to find a way that we only need to
do black-box query on the victim model [11] or attack the victim in an unsupervised fashion [2, 5].
To do black-box query on the victim model, reinforcement learning is introduced. RL-S2V [11] is
the first work to employ reinforcement learning technique to generate adversarial attacks on graph
data under the black-box setting. They model the attack procedure as a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) and the attacker is allowed to modifym edges to change the predicted label of the target
node u. They study both node-level (targeted) and graph-level (untargeted) attacks. For node-level
attack, they define the MDP as follows,
• State The state st is represented by the tuple
(
G(t ),u
)
where G(t ) is the modified graph at
time step t .
• Action A single action at time step t is denoted as at . For each action at , the attacker can
choose to add or remove an edge from the graph. Furthermore, a hierarchical structure is
applied to decompose the action space.
• Reward Since the goal of the attacker is to change the classification result of the target node
u, RL-S2V gives non-zero reward r to the attacker at the end of the MDP:
r (sm ,am) =

1 if fθ
(
G(m),u
)
, y
−1 if fθ
(
G(m),u
)
= y
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In the intermediate steps, the attacker receives no reward, i.e., ∀t = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1, r (st ,at ) =
0.
• Termination The process terminates when the attacker finishes modifyingm edges.
Since they define the MDP of graph-level attack in the similar way, we omit the details. Further, the
Q-learning algorithm [30] is adopted to solve the MDP and guide the attacker to modify the graph.
Instead of attacking node classification, the work [2] shows a way to attack the family of node
embedding models in the black-box setting. Inspired by the observation that DeepWalk can be
formulated in matrix factorization form [32], they maximize the unsupervised DeepWalk loss with
matrix perturbation theory by performing ∆ edge flips. It is further demonstrated that the perturbed
structure is transferable to other models like GCN and Label Propagation. However, this method
only considers the structure information. GF-Attack [5] is proposed to incorporate the feature
information into the attack model. Specifically, they formulate the connection between the graph
embedding method and general graph signal process with graph filter and construct the attacker
based on the graph filter and attribute matrix. GF-Attack can also be transferred to other network
embedding models and achieves better performance than the method in [2].
4.3.2 Untargeted Attack. It is argued that the perturbation constraining only the number ofmodified
edges may not be unnoticeable enough. A novel framework ReWatt [27] is proposed to solve this
problem and perform untargeted graph-level attack. Still employing a reinforcement learning
framework, ReWatt adopts the rewiring operation instead of simply adding/deleting an edge in one
single modification to make perturbation more unnoticeable. One rewiring operation involves three
nodes v1,v2 and v3, where ReWatt removes the existing edge between v1 and v2 and connects v1
andv3. ReWatt also constrainsv3 to be the 2-hop neighbor ofv1 to make perturbation smaller. Such
rewiring operation does not change the number of nodes and edges in the graph and it is further
proved that such rewiring operation affects algebraic connectivity and effective graph resistance,
both of which are important graph properties based on graph Laplacian, in a smaller way than
adding/deleting edges.
5 COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST GRAPH ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In previous sections, we have shown that graph neural networks can be easily fooled by unnoticeable
perturbation on graph data. The vulnerability of graph neural networks poses great challenges to
apply them in safety-critical applications. In order to defend the graph neural networks against
these attacks, different countermeasure strategies have been proposed. The existing methods can be
categorized into the following types: (1) adversarial training, (2) adversarial perturbation detection,
(3) certifiable robustness, (4) graph purification, and (5) attention mechanism.
5.1 Adversarial Training
Adversarial training is a widely used countermeasure for adversarial attacks in image data [16].
The main idea of adversarial training is to inject adversarial examples into the training set such
that the trained model can correctly classify the future adversarial examples. Similarly, we can also
adopt this strategy to defend graph adversarial attacks as follows,
min
θ
max
δA∈PA
δX∈PX
Ltrain (fθ (A + δA,X + δX)) , (10)
where δA, δX denote the perturbation on A,X, respectively; PA and PX stand for the domains of
imperceptible perturbation. The min-max optimization problem in Eq (10) indicates that adversarial
training involves two process: (1) generating perturbations that maximize the prediction loss and (2)
updating model parameters that minimize the prediction loss. By alternating the above two process
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iteratively, we can train a robust model against to adversarial attacks. Since there are two inputs,
i.e., adjacency matrix A and attribute matrix X, adversarial training can be done on them separately.
To generate perturbations on the adjacency matrix, it is proposed to randomly drop edges during
adversarial training [11]. Though such simple strategy cannot lead to very significant improvement
in classification accuracy (1% increase), it shows some effectiveness with such cheap adversarial
training. Furthermore, projected gradient descent is used to generate perturbations on the discrete
input structure, instead of randomly dropping edges [48]. On the other hand, an adversarial training
strategy with dynamic regularization is proposed to perturb the input features [15]. Specifically, it
includes the divergence between the prediction of the target example and its connected examples
into the objective of adversarial training, aiming to attack and reconstruct graph smoothness.
Furthermore, batch virtual adversarial training [13] is proposed to promote the smoothness of
GNNs and make GNNs more robust against adversarial perturbations. Several other variants of
adversarial training on the input layer are introduced in [8, 12, 42].
The aforementioned adversarial training strategies face two main shortcomings: (1) they generate
perturbations on A and X separately; and (2) it is not easy to perturb the graph structure due to its
discreteness. To overcome the shortcomings, instead of generating perturbation on the input, a
latent adversarial training method injects perturbations on the first hidden layer [20]:
min
θ
max
δ ∈P
Ltrain
(
fθ (G;H(1) + δ )
)
, (11)
whereH(1) denotes the representationmatrix of the first hidden layer and δ ∈ P is some perturbation
on H. It is noted that the hidden representation is continuous and it incorporates the information
from both graph structure and node attributes.
5.2 Detecting Adversarial Perturbations
To resist graph adversarial attacks during the test phase, there is one main strategy called adversary
detection. These detection models protect the GNN models by exploring the intrinsic difference
between adversarial edges/nodes and the clean edges/nodes [17, 49]. The work [49] is the first work
to propose detection approaches to find adversarial examples on graph data. It introduces four
methods to distinguish adversarial edges or nodes from the clean ones including (1) link prediction
(2) sub-graph link prediction (3) graph generation models and (4) outlier detection. These methods
have shown some help to correctly detect adversarial perturbations. The work [17] introduces a
method to randomly draw subsets of nodes, and relies on graph-aware criteria to judiciously filter
out contaminated nodes and edges before employing a semi-supervised learning (SSL) module. The
proposed model can be used to detect different anomaly generation models, as well as adversarial
attacks.
5.3 Certifiable Robustness
Previous introduced adversarial training strategies are heuristic and only show experimental
benefits. However, we still do not know whether there exist adversarial examples even when
current attacks fail. Therefore, there are works [3, 19, 57] considering to seriously reason the safety
of graph neural networks which try to certify the GNN’s robustness. As we know, GNN’s prediction
on one nodevt always depends on its neighbor nodes. In [57], they ask the question: which nodes in
a graph are safe under the risk of any admissible perturbations of its neighboring nodes’ attributes.
To answer this question, for each node v and its corresponding label yv , they try to find an upper
boundU (v) of the maximized margin loss:
U ≥ max
Xˆ∈X
(
fθ (Xˆ,A)[yv ] − fθ (Xˆ,A)[y]
)
, (12)
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where X denotes the set of all allowed attributes perturbations. This upper bound U is called
the certificate of node v , and it is tractable to calculate. Therefore, for v , if U ≤ 0, any attribute
perturbation inX can not change the model’s prediction, because its maximized margin loss is below
0. During the test phase, they calculate the certificate for all test nodes, thus they can know how
many nodes in a graph is absolutely safe under attributes perturbation. Moreover, this certificate
is trainable, directly minimizing the certificates will help more nodes become safe. However, the
work [57] only considers the perturbations on node attributes. Analyzing certifiable robustness
from a different perspective, the work [3] deals with the case when the attacker only manipulates
the graph structure. It derives the robustness certificates (similar to Eq. (12)) as a linear function of
personalized PageRank [18], which makes the optimization tractable. Besides the works concentrate
on GNN node classification tasks, there are also other works studying certifiable robustness on
GNN’s other applications such as community detection [19].
5.4 Graph Purification
Both adversarial training or certifiable defense methods only target on resisting evasion attacks,
which means that the attack happens during the test time. While, graph purification defense
methods mainly focus on defending poisoning attacks. Since the poisoning attacks insert poisons
into the training graph, purification methods first purify the perturbed graph data and then train
the GNN model on the purified graph. By this way, the GNN model is trained on a clean graph.
The work [45] proposes a purification method based on two empirical observations of the attack
methods: (1) Attackers usually prefer adding edges over removing edges or modifying features
and (2) Attackers tend to connect dissimilar nodes. As a result, they propose a defense method by
eliminating the edges whose two end nodes have small Jaccard Similarity [33]. Because these two
nodes are different and it is not likely they are connected in reality, the edge between them may be
adversarial. The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed
defense method. However, this method can only work when the node features are available. In [14],
it is observed that Nettack [55] generates the perturbations which mainly changes the small singular
values of the graph adjacency matrix. Thus it proposes to purify the perturbed adjacency matrix by
using truncated SVD to get its low-rank approximation. it further shows that only keeping the top
10 singular values of the adjacency matrix is able to defend Nettack and improve the performance
of GNNs.
5.5 Attention Mechanism
Different from the purification methods which try to exclude adversarial perturbations, attention-
based defense methods aim to train a robust GNN model by penalizing model’s weights on ad-
versarial edges or nodes. Basically, these methods learn an attention mechanism to distinguish
adversarial edges and nodes from the clean ones, and then make the adversarial perturbations
contribute less to the aggregation process of the GNN training. The work [53] first assumes that
adversarial nodes may have high prediction uncertainty, since adversary tends to connect the node
with nodes from other communities. In order to penalize the influence from these uncertain nodes,
they propose to model the l-th layer hidden representation h(l )i of nodes as Gaussian distribution
with mean value µ(l )i and variance σ
(l )
i ,
h(l )i ∼ N
(
µ(l )i , diag
(
σ (l )i
))
, (13)
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where the uncertainty can be reflected in the variance σ (l )i . When aggregating the information
from neighbor nodes, it applies an attention mechanism to penalize the nodes with high variance,
α (l )i = exp
(
−γσ (l )i
)
, (14)
where α (l )i is the attention score assigned to node i and γ is a hyper-parameter. Furthermore, it
is verified that the attacked nodes do have higher variances than normal nodes and the proposed
attention mechanism does help mitigate the impact brought by adversarial attacks.
The work in [39] suggests that to improve the robustness of one target GNNmodel, it is beneficial
to include the information from other clean graphs, which share the similar topological distributions
and node attributes with the target graph. For example, Facebook and Twitter have social network
graph data that share similar domains; Yelp and Foursquare have similar co-review graph data.
Thus, it first generates adversarial edges EP on the clean graphs, which serve as the supervision
of known perturbation. With this supervision knowledge, it further designs the following loss
function to reduce the attention score of adversarial edges:
Ldist = −min
(
η, E
ei j ∈E\EP
α (l )i j − Eei j ∈EPα
(l )
i j
)
, (15)
where E denotes the expectation, E\EP represents normal edges in the graph, α (l )i j is the attention
score assigned to edge ei j andη is a hyper parameter controlling the margin between the expectation
of two distributions. It then adopts meta-optimization to train a model initialization and fine-tunes
it on the target poisoned graph to get a robust GNN model.
6 EMPIRICAL STUDY
We have developed a repository that includes the majority of the representative attack and defense
algorithms on graphs2. The repository enables us to deepen our understandings on graph attacks
and defends via empirical study. Next we first introduce the experimental settings and then present
the empirical results and findings.
6.1 Experimental Setup
Different attack and defense methods have been designed under different settings. Due to the page
limitation, we perform the experiments with one of the most popular settings – the untargeted
poisoning setting. Correspondingly we choose representative attack and defense methods that
have been designed for this setting. Three representative attack methods are adopted to generate
perturbations including DICE [43], Metattack [56] and Topology attack [48]. It is noted that DICE
is a white-box attack which randomly connects nodes with different labels or drops edges between
nodes sharing the same label. To evaluate the performance of different defense methods under
adversarial attacks, we compare the robustness of the natural trained GCN [21] and four defense
methods on those attacked graphs, i.e., GCN [21], GCN-Jaccard [45], GCN-SVD [14], RGCN [53]
and GAT [40]. Following [56], we use three datasets: Cora, Citeseer [34] and Polblogs [1]. For each
dataset, we randomly choose 10% of nodes for training, 10% of nodes for validation and the remaining
80% for test. We repeat each experiment for 5 times and report the average performance. On Cora
and Citeseer datasets, the most destructive variant CE-min-max [48] is adopted to implement
Topology attack. But CE-min-max cannot converge on Polblogs dataset, we adopt another variant
called CE-PGD [48] on this dataset.
2https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust/tree/master/deeprobust/graph
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6.2 Analysis on Attacked Graph
One way to understand the behaviors of attacking methods is to compare the properties of the
clean graph and the attacked graph. In this subsection, we perform this analysis from both global
and local perspectives.
Global MeasureWe have collected five global properties from both clean graphs and perturbed
graphs generated by the three attacks on the three datasets. These properties include the number
of added edges, the number of deleted edges, the number of edges, the rank of the adjacent matrix,
and clustering coefficient. We only show the results of Metattack in Table 3. Results for DICE and
Topology attacks can be found in Appendix A. Note that we vary the perturbations from 0 to 25%
with a step of 5% and 0% perturbation denotes the original clean graph. It can be observed from the
table:
• Attackers favor adding edges over deleting edges.
• Attacks are likely to increase the rank of the adjacency matrix.
• Attacks are likely to reduce the connectivity of a graph. The clustering coefficients of a
perturbed graph decrease with the increase of the perturbation rate.
Table 3. Properties of attacked graphs under Metattack. Note that r denotes perturbation rate and 0%
perturbation indicates the original clean graph.
Dataset r (%) edge+ edge- edges ranks clusteringcoefficients
Cora
0 0 0 5069 2192 0.2376
5 226 27 5268 2263 0.2228
10 408 98 5380 2278 0.2132
15 604 156 5518 2300 0.2071
20 788 245 5633 2305 0.1983
25 981 287 5763 2321 0.1943
Citeseer
0 0 0 3668 1778 0.1711
5 181 2 3847 1850 0.1616
1 341 25 3985 1874 0.1565
15 485 65 4089 1890 0.1523
20 614 119 4164 1902 0.1483
25 743 174 4236 1888 0.1467
Polblogs
0 0 0 16714 1060 0.3203
5 732 103 17343 1133 0.2719
10 1347 324 17737 1170 0.2825
15 1915 592 18038 1193 0.2851
20 2304 1038 17980 1193 0.2877
25 2500 1678 17536 1197 0.2723
Local MeasureWe have also studied two local properties including the feature similarity and label
equality between two nodes connected by three kinds of edges: the newly added edges, the deleted
edges and the normal edges which have not been changed by the attack methods. Since features
are binary in our datasets, we use jaccard similarity as the measure for feature similarity. For label
equality, we report the ratio if two nodes share the same label or have different labels. The feature
similarity and label equality results are demonstrated in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. We show the
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results for Metattack with 5% perturbations. Results for DICE and Topology attacks can be found
in Appendix B. Note that we do not have feature similarity results on Polblogs since this dataset
does not have node features. We can make the following observations from the figures.
• Attackers tend to connect nodes with different labels and dissimilar features.
• Attackers tend to remove edges from nodes which share similar features and same label.
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6.3 Attack and Defense Performance
In this subsection, we study how the attack methods perform and whether the defense methods
can help resist to attacks. Similarly, we vary the perturbations from 0 to 25% with a step of 5%. The
results are demonstrated in Table 4. We show the performance for Metattack. Results for DICE and
Topology attacks are shown in Appendix C. Note that we do not have the performance for Jaccard
defense model in Polblogs since this mode requires node features and Polblogs does not provide
node features. According to the results, we have the following observations:
• With the increase of the perturbations, the performance of GCN dramatically deceases. This
result suggests that Metattack can lead to a significant reduce of accuracy on the GCN model.
• When the perturbations are small, we observe small performance reduction for defense
methods which suggests their effectiveness. However, when the graphs are heavily poisoned,
their performance also reduces significantly which indicates that efforts are needed to defend
heavily poisoning attacks.
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Table 4. Performance(Accuracy) under Metattack
Dataset r (%) 0 5 10 15 20 25
Cora
GCN 83.10 76.69 65.58 54.88 48.66 38.44
Jaccard1 82.39 81.02 77.28 72.74 69.16 64.56
SVD2 77.97 75.67 70.51 64.34 55.89 45.92
RGCN 84.81 81.32 72.12 60.25 49.75 37.76
GAT 81.69 74.75 61.69 52.56 45.30 38.52
Citeseer
GCN 74.53 72.59 63.96 61.66 50.58 44.32
Jaccard1 74.82 73.60 73.50 72.80 72.97 72.53
SVD2 70.32 71.30 67.58 63.86 56.91 45.28
RGCN 74.41 72.68 71.15 69.38 67.93 67.24
GAT 74.23 72.01 67.12 57.70 47.97 38.70
Polblogs
GCN 95.80 73.93 72.07 67.69 62.29 52.97
SVD2 94.99 82.64 71.27 66.09 61.37 52.82
RGCN 95.60 72.01 67.12 57.70 47.97 38.70
GAT 95.40 84.83 77.03 69.94 53.62 53.76
1 Jaccard: GCN-Jaccard defense model.
2 SVD: GCN-SVD defense model.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this survey, we give a comprehensive overview of an emerging research field, adversarial
attacks and defenses on graph data. We investigate the taxonomy of graph adversarial attacks, and
review representative adversarial attacks and the corresponding countermeasures. Furthermore, we
conduct empirical study to show how different defense methods behave under different attacks, as
well as the changes in important graph properties by the attacks. Via this comprehensive study, we
have gained deep understandings on this area that enables us to discuss some promising research
directions.
• Imperceptible perturbation measure. Different from image data, humans cannot easily
tell whether a perturbation on graph is imperceptible or not. The ℓ0 norm constraint on
perturbation is definitely not enough. Currently only very few existing work study this
problem, thus finding concise perturbation evaluation measure is of great urgency.
• Different graph data. Existing works mainly focus on static graphs with node attributes.
Complex graphs such as graphs with edge attributes and dynamic graphs are not well-studied
yet.
• Existence and transferability of graph adversarial examples. There are only a few
works discussing about the existence and transferability of graph adversarial examples.
Studying this topic is important for us to understand our graph learning algorithm, thus
helping us build robust models.
• Graph structure learning. By analyzing the attacked graph, we find that attacks are likely
to change certain properties of graphs. Therefore, we can learn a graph from the poisoned
graphs by exploring these properties to build robust GNNs.
111:16 Jin et al.
REFERENCES
[1] Lada A Adamic and Natalie Glance. 2005. The political blogosphere and the 2004 US election: divided they blog. In
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Link discovery. 36–43.
[2] Aleksandar Bojchevski and Stephan Günnemann. 2018. Adversarial attacks on node embeddings via graph poisoning.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.01093 (2018).
[3] Aleksandar Bojchevski and Stephan Günnemann. 2019. Certifiable Robustness to Graph Perturbations. In Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems. 8317–8328.
[4] Antoine Bordes, Nicolas Usunier, Alberto Garcia-Duran, Jason Weston, and Oksana Yakhnenko. 2013. Translating
embeddings for modeling multi-relational data. In Advances in neural information processing systems. 2787–2795.
[5] Heng Chang, Yu Rong, Tingyang Xu, Wenbing Huang, Honglei Zhang, Peng Cui, Wenwu Zhu, and Junzhou Huang.
2019. The General Black-box Attack Method for Graph Neural Networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.01297 (2019).
[6] Jinyin Chen, Lihong Chen, Yixian Chen, Minghao Zhao, Shanqing Yu, Qi Xuan, and Xiaoniu Yang. 2019. Ga-based
q-attack on community detection. IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems 6, 3 (2019), 491–503.
[7] Jinyin Chen, Ziqiang Shi, Yangyang Wu, Xuanheng Xu, and Haibin Zheng. 2018. Link prediction adversarial attack.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.01110 (2018).
[8] Jinyin Chen, Yangyang Wu, Xiang Lin, and Qi Xuan. 2019. Can Adversarial Network Attack be Defended? arXiv
preprint arXiv:1903.05994 (2019).
[9] Jinyin Chen, Yangyang Wu, Xuanheng Xu, Yixian Chen, Haibin Zheng, and Qi Xuan. 2018. Fast gradient attack on
network embedding. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.02797 (2018).
[10] Yizheng Chen, Yacin Nadji, Athanasios Kountouras, Fabian Monrose, Roberto Perdisci, Manos Antonakakis, and
Nikolaos Vasiloglou. 2017. Practical attacks against graph-based clustering. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 1125–1142.
[11] Hanjun Dai, Hui Li, Tian Tian, Xin Huang, Lin Wang, Jun Zhu, and Le Song. 2018. Adversarial attack on graph
structured data. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.02371 (2018).
[12] Quanyu Dai, Xiao Shen, Liang Zhang, Qiang Li, and Dan Wang. 2019. Adversarial training methods for network
embedding. In The World Wide Web Conference. 329–339.
[13] Zhijie Deng, Yinpeng Dong, and Jun Zhu. 2019. Batch virtual adversarial training for graph convolutional networks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.09192 (2019).
[14] Negin Entezari, Saba A Al-Sayouri, Amirali Darvishzadeh, and Evangelos E Papalexakis. 2020. All You Need Is Low
(Rank) Defending Against Adversarial Attacks on Graphs. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web
Search and Data Mining. 169–177.
[15] Fuli Feng, Xiangnan He, Jie Tang, and Tat-Seng Chua. 2019. Graph adversarial training: Dynamically regularizing
based on graph structure. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (2019).
[16] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. 2014. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572 (2014).
[17] Vassilis N Ioannidis, Dimitris Berberidis, and Georgios B Giannakis. 2019. GraphSAC: Detecting anomalies in large-scale
graphs. arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.09589 (2019).
[18] Glen Jeh and Jennifer Widom. 2003. Scaling personalized web search. In Proceedings of the 12th international conference
on World Wide Web. 271–279.
[19] Jinyuan Jia, Binghui Wang, Xiaoyu Cao, and Neil Zhenqiang Gong. 2020. Certified Robustness of Community Detection
against Adversarial Structural Perturbation via Randomized Smoothing. arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.03421 (2020).
[20] Hongwei Jin and Xinhua Zhang. 2019. Latent adversarial training of graph convolution networks. In ICML Workshop
on Learning and Reasoning with GraphStructured Representations.
[21] Thomas N Kipf and Max Welling. 2016. Semi-supervised classification with graph convolutional networks. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1609.02907 (2016).
[22] Loic Landrieu and Martin Simonovsky. 2018. Large-scale point cloud semantic segmentation with superpoint graphs.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 4558–4567.
[23] Jia Li, Honglei Zhang, Zhichao Han, Yu Rong, Hong Cheng, and Junzhou Huang. 2020. Adversarial Attack on
Community Detection by Hiding Individuals. arXiv:2001.07933 [cs.SI]
[24] Yankai Lin, Zhiyuan Liu, Maosong Sun, Yang Liu, and Xuan Zhu. 2015. Learning entity and relation embeddings for
knowledge graph completion. In Twenty-ninth AAAI conference on artificial intelligence.
[25] Xuanqing Liu, Si Si, Xiaojin Zhu, Yang Li, and Cho-Jui Hsieh. 2019. A unified framework for data poisoning attack to
graph-based semi-supervised learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.14147 (2019).
[26] Tengfei Ma, Cao Xiao, Jiayu Zhou, and Fei Wang. 2018. Drug similarity integration through attentive multi-view graph
auto-encoders. arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.10850 (2018).
[27] Yao Ma, Suhang Wang, Lingfei Wu, and Jiliang Tang. 2019. Attacking graph convolutional networks via rewiring.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.03750 (2019).
Adversarial Attacks and Defenses on Graphs:
A Review and Empirical Study 111:17
[28] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu. 2017. Towards deep
learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083 (2017).
[29] Diego Marcheggiani and Ivan Titov. 2017. Encoding sentences with graph convolutional networks for semantic role
labeling. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.04826 (2017).
[30] Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, David Silver, Alex Graves, Ioannis Antonoglou, Daan Wierstra, and Martin
Riedmiller. 2013. Playing atari with deep reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.5602 (2013).
[31] Bryan Perozzi, Rami Al-Rfou, and Steven Skiena. 2014. Deepwalk: Online learning of social representations. In
Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining. 701–710.
[32] Jiezhong Qiu, Yuxiao Dong, Hao Ma, Jian Li, Kuansan Wang, and Jie Tang. 2018. Network embedding as matrix
factorization: Unifying deepwalk, line, pte, and node2vec. In Proceedings of the Eleventh ACM International Conference
on Web Search and Data Mining. 459–467.
[33] Alan Said, Ernesto W De Luca, and Sahin Albayrak. [n.d.]. How social relationships affect user similarities.
[34] Prithviraj Sen, Galileo Namata, Mustafa Bilgic, Lise Getoor, Brian Galligher, and Tina Eliassi-Rad. 2008. Collective
classification in network data. AI magazine 29, 3 (2008), 93–93.
[35] Lichao Sun, Ji Wang, Philip S Yu, and Bo Li. 2018. Adversarial attack and defense on graph data: A survey. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1812.10528 (2018).
[36] Yiwei Sun, Suhang Wang, Xianfeng Tang, Tsung-Yu Hsieh, and Vasant Honavar. 2019. Node injection attacks on
graphs via reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.06543 (2019).
[37] Mukund Sundararajan, Ankur Taly, and Qiqi Yan. 2017. Axiomatic attribution for deep networks. In Proceedings of the
34th International Conference on Machine Learning-Volume 70. JMLR. org, 3319–3328.
[38] Jian Tang, Meng Qu, Mingzhe Wang, Ming Zhang, Jun Yan, and Qiaozhu Mei. 2015. Line: Large-scale information
network embedding. In Proceedings of the 24th international conference on world wide web. 1067–1077.
[39] Xianfeng Tang, Yandong Li, Yiwei Sun, Huaxiu Yao, Prasenjit Mitra, and Suhang Wang. 2020. Transferring Robustness
for Graph Neural Network Against Poisoning Attacks. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web Search
and Data Mining. 600–608.
[40] Petar Veličković, Guillem Cucurull, Arantxa Casanova, Adriana Romero, Pietro Lio, and Yoshua Bengio. 2017. Graph
attention networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.10903 (2017).
[41] Binghui Wang and Neil Zhenqiang Gong. 2019. Attacking graph-based classification via manipulating the graph
structure. In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2023–2040.
[42] XiaoyunWang, Xuanqing Liu, and Cho-Jui Hsieh. 2019. GraphDefense: Towards Robust Graph Convolutional Networks.
arXiv:1911.04429 [cs.LG]
[43] Marcin Waniek, Tomasz P. Michalak, Michael J. Wooldridge, and Talal Rahwan. 2018. Hiding individuals and communi-
ties in a social network. Nature Human Behaviour 2, 2 (Jan 2018), 139âĂŞ147. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0290-3
[44] MarcinWaniek, Tomasz PMichalak,Michael JWooldridge, and Talal Rahwan. 2018. Hiding individuals and communities
in a social network. Nature Human Behaviour 2, 2 (2018), 139–147.
[45] Huijun Wu, Chen Wang, Yuriy Tyshetskiy, Andrew Docherty, Kai Lu, and Liming Zhu. 2019. Adversarial examples for
graph data: deep insights into attack and defense. In Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence. AAAI Press, 4816–4823.
[46] Zonghan Wu, Shirui Pan, Fengwen Chen, Guodong Long, Chengqi Zhang, and Philip S Yu. 2019. A comprehensive
survey on graph neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.00596 (2019).
[47] Han Xu, Yao Ma, Haochen Liu, Debayan Deb, Hui Liu, Jiliang Tang, and Anil Jain. 2019. Adversarial attacks and
defenses in images, graphs and text: A review. arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.08072 (2019).
[48] Kaidi Xu, Hongge Chen, Sijia Liu, Pin-Yu Chen, Tsui-Wei Weng, Mingyi Hong, and Xue Lin. 2019. Topology attack and
defense for graph neural networks: An optimization perspective. arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.04214 (2019).
[49] Xiaojun Xu, Yue Yu, Bo Li, Le Song, Chengfeng Liu, and Carl Gunter. 2018. Characterizing Malicious Edges targeting
on Graph Neural Networks. (2018).
[50] Xiao Zang, Yi Xie, Jie Chen, and Bo Yuan. 2020. Graph Universal Adversarial Attacks: A Few Bad Actors Ruin Graph
Learning Models. arXiv:2002.04784 [cs.LG]
[51] Hengtong Zhang, Tianhang Zheng, Jing Gao, Chenglin Miao, Lu Su, Yaliang Li, and Kui Ren. 2019. Towards Data
Poisoning Attack against Knowledge Graph Embedding. ArXiv abs/1904.12052 (2019).
[52] Qi Zhou, Yizhi Ren, Tianyu Xia, Lifeng Yuan, and Linqiang Chen. 2020. Data Poisoning Attacks on Graph Convolutional
Matrix Completion. In Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing.
[53] Dingyuan Zhu, Ziwei Zhang, Peng Cui, andWenwu Zhu. 2019. Robust graph convolutional networks against adversarial
attacks. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining.
1399–1407.
[54] Xiaojin Zhu and Zoubin Ghahramani. 2002. Learning from labeled and unlabeled data with label propagation. (2002).
111:18 Jin et al.
[55] Daniel Zügner, Amir Akbarnejad, and Stephan Günnemann. 2018. Adversarial attacks on neural networks for graph data.
In Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining. 2847–2856.
[56] Daniel Zügner and Stephan Günnemann. 2019. Adversarial attacks on graph neural networks via meta learning. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1902.08412 (2019).
[57] Daniel Zügner and Stephan Günnemann. 2019. Certifiable robustness and robust training for graph convolutional
networks. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining.
246–256.
A APPENDIX
A.1 Open Source Code
Table 5. A Summary of Open-source Implementations
Methods Framework Github Link
Attack
PGD, Min-max [48] tensorflowpytorch
https://github.com/KaidiXu/GCN_ADV_Train
https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust
DICE [44] python https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust
Nettack [55] tensorflow https://github.com/danielzuegner/nettack
Metattack [56] tensorflowpytorch
https://github.com/danielzuegner/gnn-meta-attack
https://github.com/ChandlerBang/pytorch-gnn-meta-attack
RL-S2V [11] pytorch https://github.com/Hanjun-Dai/graph_adversarial_attack
[2] tensorflow https://github.com/abojchevski/node_embedding_attack
GF-Attack [5] tensoflow https://github.com/SwiftieH/GFAttack
Defense
RGCN [53]
tensorflow
pytorch
https://github.com/thumanlab/nrlweb/blob/master/static/
assets/download/RGCN.zip
https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust
GCN-Jaccard [45] pytorch https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust
GCN-SVD [14] pytorch https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust
Adversarial
Training [48]
tensorflow
pytorch
https://github.com/KaidiXu/GCN_ADV_Train
https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust
PA-GNN [39] tensorflow https://github.com/tangxianfeng/PA-GNN
Graph-Cert [3] python https://github.com/abojchevski/graph_cert
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A.2 Global Measures for Dice and Topology Attacks
Table 6. Properties of attacked graphs under Topology Attack
Dataset r (%) edges+ edges- edges ranks clusteringcoefficients
Cora
0 0 0 5069 2192 0.2376
5 255 0 5324 2292 0.2308
10 508 0 5577 2369 0.2185
15 762 0 5831 2417 0.2029
20 1015 0 6084 2442 0.1875
25 1269 0 6338 2456 0.1736
Citeseer
0 0 0 3668 1778 0.1711
5 185 0 3853 1914 0.1666
10 368 0 4036 2003 0.1568
15 552 0 4220 2058 0.1429
20 735 0 4403 2077 0.1306
25 918 0 4586 2087 0.1188
Polblogs
0 0 0 16714 1060 0.3203
5 716 96 17334 1213 0.2659
10 1532 128 18118 1220 0.2513
15 2320 146 18887 1221 0.2408
20 3149 155 19708 1221 0.2317
25 3958 163 20509 1221 0.2238
Table 7. Properties of attacked graphs under DICE Attack
Dataset r (%) edge+ edge- edges ranks clusteringcoefficients
Cora
0 0 0 5069 2192 0.2376
5 125 128 5066 2210 0.2163
10 251 255 5065 2238 0.1966
15 377 383 5063 2246 0.1786
20 504 509 5063 2261 0.1583
25 625 642 5053 2270 0.1448
Citeseer
0 0 0 3668 1778 0.1711
5 91 92 3667 1803 0.1576
10 183 183 3668 1828 0.1408
15 276 274 3670 1840 0.1288
20 368 365 3672 1860 0.1187
25 462 455 36755 1871 0.1084
Polblogs
0 0 0 16714 1060 0.3203
5 420 415 16719 1155 0.2822
10 846 825 16736 1192 0.2487
15 1273 1234 16752 1208 0.2224
20 1690 1652 16752 1214 0.2009
25 2114 2064 16765 1217 0.1821
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A.3 Local Measures for Dice and Topology Attacks
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Fig. 4. Node feature similarity for Topology Attack
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Fig. 5. Node feature similarity for DICE Attack
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Fig. 6. Label equality for Topology Attack
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Fig. 7. Label equality for DICE Attack
A.4 Attack and Defense Performance for Dice and Topology Attacks
Table 8. Performance(Accuracy) under DICE Attack
Dataset r (%) 0 5 10 15 20 25
Cora
GCN 83.10 82.20 81.15 80.54 79.40 77.78
Jaccard1 82.39 81.66 80.94 80.24 79.41 78.31
SVD2 77.97 76.55 74.35 72.71 59.77 70.41
RGCN 84.81 83.87 82.72 81.64 80.77 79.53
GAT 81.69 79.33 77.36 75.23 73.78 72.05
Citeseer
GCN 74.53 74.21 73.90 72.36 72.27 71.50
Jaccard1 74.82 74.56 74.14 73.51 73.22 72.22
SVD2 70.32 70.91 70.27 69.19 67.63 66.82
RGCN 74.41 74.72 74.22 73.42 72.71 72.16
GAT 74.23 73.78 72.86 71.48 70.25 69.68
Polblogs
GCN 95.80 92.78 90.78 90.12 88.28 87.79
SVD2 94.99 93.09 92.39 91.31 90.72 90.61
RGCN 95.60 92.72 90.70 89.80 88.34 87.28
GAT 95.40 93.56 91.82 91.27 89.65 89.30
1 Jaccard: GCN-Jaccard defense model.
2 SVD: GCN-SVD defense model.
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Table 9. Performance(Accuracy) under Topology Attack
Dataset r (%) 0 5 10 15 20 25
Cora
GCN 83.10 71.82 68.96 66.77 64.21 62.52
Jaccard1 82.39 73.05 72.62 71.84 71.41 70.85
SVD2 77.97 78.17 75.92 73.69 72.03 70.11
RGCN 84.81 72.68 71.15 69.38 67.92 67.23
GAT 81.69 71.03 68.80 65.66 64.29 62.58
Citeseer
GCN 74.53 79.29 75.47 72.89 70.12 68.49
Jaccard1 74.82 79.07 76.76 74.29 71.87 69.55
SVD2 70.32 78.17 75.92 73.69 72.03 70.11
RGCN 74.41 78.13 75.93 73.93 72.32 70.60
GAT 74.23 77.52 74.09 71.90 69.62 66.99
Polblogs
GCN 95.80 72.04 65.87 63.35 61.06 58.49
SVD2 94.99 71.90 65.42 63.01 60.74 58.26
RGCN 95.60 71.27 65.30 62.76 60.25 57.89
GAT 95.40 72.56 65.97 63.35 60.94 58.77
1 Jaccard: GCN-Jaccard defense model.
2 SVD: GCN-SVD defense model.
